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Lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement for
Smart Metering in Smart Energy Networks
Pardeep Kumar, Member, IEEE, Andrei Gurtov, Senior Member, IEEE, Mangal Sain, Andrew Martin, and
Phuong H. Ha
Abstract—Smart meters are considered as foundational part
of the smart metering infrastructure (SMI) in smart energy
networks. Smart meter is a digital device that makes use of two-
way communication between consumer and utility to exchange,
manage and control energy consumptions within a home. How-
ever, despite all the features, a smart meter raises several security-
related concerns. For instance, how to exchange data between
the legal entities (e.g., smart meter and utility server) while
maintaining privacy of the consumer. To address these concerns,
authentication and key agreement in SMI can provide important
security properties that not only to maintain a trust between the
legitimate entities but also to satisfy other security services. This
work presents a lightweight authentication and key agreement
(LAKA) that enables trust, anonymity, integrity and adequate
security in the domain of smart energy network. The proposed
scheme employs hybrid cryptography to facilitate mutual trust
(authentication), dynamic session key, integrity, and anonymity.
We justify the feasibility of the proposed scheme with a test-
bed using 802.15.4 based device (i.e., smart meter). Moreover,
through the security and performance analysis, we show that the
proposed scheme is more effective and energy efficient compared
to the previous schemes.
Index Terms—Authentication, key agreement, smart metering
infrastructure, smart energy networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART energy network (SEN) is known as a revolutionarysolution for the future energy industry. In practice, it
includes various notable features, such as reduce carbon foot-
print, provide uninterrupted energy supply, balancing supply-
demand, monitoring inflicted load, efficient power quality,
smart billing, and many more [1]. Altogether, SEN can operate
much more reliably and efficiently to serve a number of enti-
ties, for instance customers (domestic or non-domestic), local
societies and governments, etc. A smart metering infrastructure
is one of the main application domains in the SEN. This
infrastructure integrates the utility company and consumers
to actively participate in the real time energy management
programs. World-wide several smart metering projects are
under-way, e.g., 30 millions electricity meters are smart in
Italy. Several SMI-based pilot projects are under progress in
Germany, e.g., E-DeMa, SmartWatts [2]. Moreover, in the
Netherlands and Great Britain, smart gas and smart electricity
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meters being included together in SMI network. For more
details on the EU smart metering projects refer to [3].
A SEN is an intelligent network where a massive num-
ber of heterogeneous devices, several open communications
and networking technologies are anticipated to be deployed
between the energy companies and consumers. For instance,
Fig. 1 shows a typical SMI network – a home area network
(HAN) where resource-constrained smart meters (e.g., gas
and electricity) generally collect, control and manage the
utility consumptions within a home. Furthermore, utilizing
a two-way communication technology, the smart meter can
transmit/receive data and control commands to/from the neigh-
bourhood area network (NAN) gateway and then to/from the
utility server (US).
Smart meters (i.e., gas and electricity) are usually installed
outside of the home (i.e., in open environment), and are
protected with a physical box [4]. Note that smart meter and
meter are used interchangeably. Nevertheless, such openness
of smart meters, inevitably surrender them to a number of
potential vulnerabilities. For instance: (i) an unauthorized user
may compromise a meter from the physical box and control
the home appliances. Moreover, he/she may counterfeit device
(e.g., smart meter) failures by tampering meter data and/or by
injecting falsify data for “tripping” to cut the energy off. (ii) As
a smart meter usually sends consumption usage every 15/30/60
minutes periodically [5], an ill-intention user may eavesdrop
wireless communication channels, and may leak consumption
data for own purposes [6]. Such message leaks can directly
used to invade privacy of the consumer (e.g., what time the
property is occupied or empty, etc.), as discussed in [7], [8].
(iii) Even worse, if vulnerabilities are exploited successfully
then an adversary could surprisingly damage the entire home,
city, and/or societies to tumble apart [5]. For instance, on
December 23, 2015, three Ukrainian energy supply companies
experienced massive cyberattack that resulted in the power
blackout in a region for several hours, as reported in [9]. In
this attack, one of the vulnerabilities is attributed to lack of
adequate authentication that was exploited by the attackers to
break the control systems of the grid [9].
1) Related work: Authentication is considered as an imper-
ative property in the identification of an entity to protect unau-
thorized accesses and to eliminate several security attacks [10].
Recently, many authentication and key agreement schemes
have been discussed and presented in the context of SMI
for smart grid (SG) [11]–[23]. Many of these protocols (e.g.,
[13]–[16]) are originally focusing on one-way authentication
while leaving out two-way authentication. For example, He
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et al. [13] proposed an enhanced public key infrastructure
(PKI) for securing SG networks. The scheme performed one-
way authentication from a smart meter to the NAN gateway.
The authors exploited PKI based digital signatures especially
resisting denial of service attack. To justify the feasibility
of enhanced scheme, He et al. implemented elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) via TinyECC library for the resource-
constrained smart meter. Their scheme takes 3.169 seconds
to generate a signature for per-packet, and 4 seconds for per-
packet signature verification. As a result, the scheme required
high complexity at the meter. Similar to He et al. [13], Chim
et al. [14] proposed privacy-preserving scheme that utilized
cryptographic commitments to send consumption usages from
the meter to utility via the NAN gateway. The Chim et al.’s
scheme mainly supports one-way authentication and achieves
privacy. Note that in [13], [14], a smart meter is being
authenticated at the NAN gateway, but it cannot verify whether
the NAN gateway is a legal entity. Consequently, the schemes
proposed in [13]–[16] may lead to many security threats, e.g.,
a smart meter may accept fake control commands from an
attacker, since the NAN gateway is not being verified at the
smart meter. Furthermore, in a worst scenario, a fake control
command can turn the house blackout. As a result, one-way
authentication may not provide enough security in two-way
communication use-cases.
On the other hand, the protocols presented in [11], [17]–
[21], [23], performed mutual authentication in smart grid but
most of the schemes required high computational overhead
that may pose performance (i.e., availability) issue in such
critical infrastructure. For instance, to perform mutual authen-
tication and key establishment, Fouda et al. [11] suggested
a lightweight and secure authentication where a smart meter
is expected to be verified before it communicates with other
entities. The authors utilized the Diffie-Helman protocol to
perform mutual authentication, and established a session key
between two entities (i.e., smart meter and NAN). The scheme
requires higher packet delay for executing numbers of mes-
sages. Moreover, the packet delay is ≈ 11 seconds which could
be a strongest link from an attacker perspective: if thousands of
smart meters are deployed then the attacker may easily mount
various security attacks, e.g., denial-of-service.
To generate a secure session key between the smart meter
and authentication server, Nicanfar et al. proposed a scheme
that verifies communicating entities mutually [17]. The authors
used a key generator to refresh the public and private keys
along with multicasting keys, which are then broadcasted
periodically to all smart meters. However, the authors in [1]
and [22] argued that the Nicanfar et al.’s scheme is neither
comparatively practical nor efficient for the smart meter, as
the scheme required heavy computations.
In 2016, Tsai-Lo proposed a secure anonymous key distribu-
tion scheme for SG communications [19]. The authors utilized
an identity based signature to achieve mutual authentication
and anonymity at low computational cost. Moreover, it can
resist to a number of attacks, e.g., replay, impersonation, man-
in-the-middle (MITM), etc. However, the scheme of Tsai-
Lo is being failed to provide session key (SKey) security
and smart meter’s credientials privacy underneath the Canetti-
Krawczyk’s attack model, as pointed out by Odelu et al. in
[20]. Then in [20], the authors proposed another (secure)
authentication and session key agreement scheme in SG. Odelu
et al. asserted that their scheme required low computational
cost and more secure than the Tsai-Lo’s scheme. However,
the Odelu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation
attack and that may lead to forgery of the messages, MITM,
and/or message integrity issue, as pointed out in [24]. Using
ECC, He et al. proposed a new lightweight, anonymous,
and key distribution (AKD) scheme in [21]. AKD adopts
Schnorr’s signature [25] technique to achieve the efficiency.
Mohammadali et al. [22] proposed a novel identity based
key establishment scheme for MICAZ-based smart metering
networks. The authors claimed that their scheme is secure
against many real attacks, e.g., replay, impersonation, man-in-
the-middle attack, etc. However, the scheme may not withstand
against identity spoofing attack, since the smart meter identity
is used as a plain-text.
Considering PKI, Mahmood et al. proposed a lightweight
message authentication scheme for SG [23]. The authors uti-
lized hybrid cryptosystem (i.e., AES and RSA). Recent studies
revealed that the operation of public key (e.g., encryption)
may be practical but the operations of private key are still
time consuming (e.g., decryption takes 5.2s and signature
generation takes 5.21s [22]) for a resource constrained device
(e.g., MICAZ-based smart meter).
To mitigate outsider and insider attacks, Saxena et al. [10]
discussed another authentication and authorization scheme in
SG. In the scheme, an individual needs to perform authenti-
cation and authorization to access a smart meter. An attribute-
based access control is utilized to confirm individual’s identity
together with the device. The overall overhead of the scheme
is 328.37 bytes, which is still expensive for those meters that
have limited computational power, transmission capability and
energy-source (e.g., a smart gas meter [26]).
Indeed, the power source may not be the main concern for
a smart electricity meter, which is usually connected with
the main-supply. While on the contrary, the power source
is a major issue for a smart gas meter, which is a battery-
powered device [26]. For instance, a smart meter periodically
sends consumption usages to the utility, however, such periodic
communications need more energy to send a large number of
packets. Hence, the security scheme should be energy-efficient
(in the terms of computational and communicational costs) so
as to maximize the smart meter and network lifetime, while
providing the adequate level of security.
2) Motivation: The one-way authentication schemes, and
the high computational and communicational costs can raise
concern in two-way smart energy communications. Moreover,
in the SEN communication, the integrity of messages is
equally important as other security properties, since message
integrity provides assurance that the messages are not been
altered/forged in transit (or from the origin), as suggested by
the National Institute Standards Technology (NIST) [27]. A
loss of integrity may cause destruction of information and may
lead to incorrect decision in smart energy network. However,
the most of recently proposed schemes (e.g., [17], [19], [20],
[21]), are vulnerable where an attacker can violate message
1949-3053 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSG.2018.2857558, IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid
3
Optical NetworkUtility Server #1 Utility Server #N
xG xG
Neighbourhood Area 
Network (NAN) #1
NAN gateway  
#1
HAN #1HA  #1
HAN #NHA  #
Neighbourhood Area 
Network (NAN) #N
NAN gateway 
#N
HAN #1HA  #1
HAN #NHA  #
Smart Meter
Zi
gB
ee
ZigBee
Zi
gB
ee
ZigBee
Fig. 1. Considered Smart Metering Infrastructure.
integrity. Therefore, it becomes necessary to establish a mutual
authentication that can support dynamic key agreement to
realize its efficiency while providing the adequate level of
security functionalities.
3) Our contribution: We propose a new lightweight authen-
tication and key agreement (LAKA) scheme for SMI from the
perspective of SENs and the main contributions are:
• LAKA supports mutual authentication, key establishment,
anonymity, integrity, and realizing its practicality in the
SMI. The scheme requires less computational cost as it is
built upon the ECC, symmetric encryption, hash function
and message authentication code.
• We analyze the security strength of LAKA and utilize
AVISPA (i.e., automated verification of Internet security
protocol and application) tool to formally prove that the
SMI is semantically secure with the help of our scheme.
• The viability of LAKA is validated using IEEE 802.15.4
based smart meter. Furthermore, we report performance
evaluation results, and demonstrate that the proposed
scheme is lightweight and provide more security services
than the previously proposed schemes.
II. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, THREAT MODEL AND
SECURITY GOALS
1) Network architecture: By generalizing the previous pro-
posals [11], [14], [28], [29], consider a hierarchical smart
energy network model (Fig. 1), including a home area network
(HAN), and a neighbourhood area network (NAN).
• Every HAN contains a smart meter that measures and
collects the utility usages within a home. Through the
smart meter, the consumption usages are not only be
received (periodically) by the utility (refer to Fig. 1) but a
consumer can also received them to monitor and control
in day-to-day life.
To do this, a smart meter communicates to the NAN
gateway via public channels. A smart meter data is
vulnerable as the communication channels between the
source (i.e., smart meter) and destination (i.e., NAN)
can be manipulated purposefully. Thus it is necessary to
authenticate both the entities prior their participation in
the SEN [11] [14].
• The NAN gateway collects consumption readings from
several smart meters, and forwards collected readings to
the utility server, securely. The NAN gateway provides
the interface between the upper layer (i.e., utility server)
and the lower layer (i.e., meter). It is usually integrated
with wireless (ZigBee, WiMAX, WiFi, etc.) or wired
technologies, and distributed over many cities, or villages.
Moreover, the physical security of the NAN gateway can
be protected as it is located inside substation and locked
from outsider access as recommended by [14] [30]. Note
that the main focus of our scheme is to establish a
secure and efficient communication between the two ends
(i.e., smart meter and NAN). We assumed that the NAN
gateway is securely connected with the utility server (US).
2) Threat Model: Following Fig. 1, we assume that an
attacker (e.g., Dolve-Yao threat model [31]) can eavesdrop and
intercept two-way wireless channels between the smart meter
and the NAN gateway. An attacker can attempt to replay the
old messages either to SM or to NAN gateway. He/she can
attempt to inject new messages and forge messages for own
purpose. Moreover, an adversary can spoof identities or other
important parameters in order to learn sensitive information
from the consumer to the NAN communication and vice-versa.
3) Security goals: Towards a SMI network an adequate se-
curity suite essentially satisfies the following goals: 1) Mutual
authentication and key establishment: In a SMI network, it
is paramount security requirement that a NAN gateway must
authenticate to a smart meter, since consumption data collected
from smart meters will be utilized for many purposes e.g.,
billing, load balancing, etc. Similarly, a smart meter should
authenticate the NAN gateway in order to protect from fake
messages (e.g., control commands, etc.) from an attacker. Thus
mutual authentication is highly required [32]. As soon as
mutual authentication verified, a fresh session key agreement
should be generated for the legal parties, so that subsequent
communication could take place securely. 2) Confidentiality:
As per the NIST security policies, the messages which are be-
ing exchanged over public channels between any two or more
legal entities should not be disclosed against illegal access and
modification. 3) Message Integrity: Similar to confidentiality,
message integrity is also important requirement in smart grid
as suggested in the NIST security guideline. So that protocol’s
messages can not be forged in transit or from their origin. 4)
Availability: The messages should available timely – the SMI
requires high computational and communicational efficiency to
execute the security mechanisms. Therefore, the process and/or
overhead of authentication should be as low as possible [27].
5) Forward security: An adversary should not be correlated
to any two communication sessions, and also should not be
derived the past messages according to the ongoing session. 6)
Anonymity: Smart meters are supposed to transmit attributable
fine grained data to the utility for the billing use-case. Nev-
ertheless, the attributable fine grained data including device
identity, energy usage, and so on, is vulnerable. For instance,
an adversary can easily spoof/correlate the identities of smart
meters that are reporting detailed fine grained information
from the HAN to NAN. Thus, the identity of a meter should
be kept private.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme involves mainly two entities (the
smart meter (SM) and the NAN gateway). Before describing
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TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND DESCRIPTIONS
Symbols Descriptions
NID Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) identity
SMID Smart meter identity
ST , idST Secret token and its identity
EK [ms] Encrypt ms using key (K)
DK [ms] Decrypt ms using key (K)
p, n Large prime numbers
Fq A finite field
E Elliptic curve defined on finite field Fq with prime order n
G Group of elliptic curve points on E
P A point on elliptic curve E with order n
H(.) One-way hash function (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-2, MD5, etc.)
MAC, || Message authentication code, and concatenation operation
φ, φN SM’s and NAN’s pseudo random numbers, respectively
the proposed scheme, we have made few assumptions: (i)
The clocks of SM and NAN gateway are synchronized as
recommended in [14], [33]–[35]. (ii) The NAN gateway is
a trusted service provider and resource-rich entity [11], [14],
[28], [29] and (iii) The smart meters have to be registered with
NAN to obtain the security parameters. Table I describes used
notations and symbols throughout the paper.
1) System setup phase: As a trusted entity, the NAN
gateway should be able to perform the off-line tasks, such as,
assigning security parameters, assigning identity to SMs and
keeping access logs, securely. In this phase, the NAN gateway
sets up security parameters, as follows.
Note: due to the page limit we omitted background of the
ECC, the reader may refer to [36], [37]. The NAN chooses
an elliptic curve E and a point P of order n over the curve
E. Generates a high entropy master key (Mk) and public key
Ps = Mk · P . Now it selects one way secure hash function
(e.g., H()). Finally it keeps Mk secure in own database, and
publishes Fp, P, E, n, Ps, H().
2) Registration phase: The household smart meter needs to
be registered at the NAN gateway before participating into the
SEN and obtained security parameters, as follows. For each
SM (say j), the NAN generates and assigns an unique identity
(SMIDj ) and a secret token STj with its identifier (idSTj ). It
uses SMIDj to compute σj = H(SMIDj ) and public key, i.e.,
(SMpubj = (σj+Mk)P = σjP+Ps). Then it uses the master
key Mk to compute SM’s corresponding private key SMprj =
1
Mk+σj
P ∈ G. Similar to [19] [20], the NAN stores all the
security parameters (Fp, P, E, n, STj , idSTj , H(), σj , SMprj )
in SM’s tamper-proof memory. In addition, the NAN gateway
also stores SMIDj , NID in the memory of meter so that it
can recognize the respective NAN gateway. Finally, the NAN
gateway keeps all the parameters in own database to keep
records of the deployed SMs.
3) Authentication and key establishment phase: To attain
LAKA’s goals, i.e., lightweight authentication and key estab-
lishment, the detailed procedure is as follows.
(A) The SM chooses random number uSMj ∈ Z∗n and com-
putes ASMj = uSMj ·P and BSMj = uSMj ·SMprj . Then
it computes L1 = H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||BSMj ||T1)
and Q1 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T1]. Note: T1 denotes the
current time stamp of SM. In order to provide the message
integrity, the SM computes Y 1 = MACL1[SMIDj , T1,
ASMj ]. It generates a pseudo number (φ) and computes
α = H(NID||φ) ⊕ idSTj ||T1, and finally, sends a
message, start {α,Q1, ASMj , Y 1, φ, T1} to the NAN.
(B) Upon receiving the message, the NAN gateway first
checks the validity of time using (T2 − T1) ≤ ∆T ,
if it does not hold then aborts the system. Note: T2
denotes the current time stamp of NAN and ∆T is the
transmission delay. Otherwise, it computes H(NID||φ)
and obtains idSTj , gets corresponding token (STj)
of idSTj , and SMIDj from own database. Decrypts
DSTj [Q1], and obtains SM
∗
IDj
, N∗ID, T1
∗. Now checks
(SM∗IDj = SMIDj , N
∗
ID = NID, and T1
∗ = T1),
if these conditions are not being verified then it aborts
current session request. Now, the NAN gateway computes
σ′j = H(SMIDj ), B
′
SMj =
1
Mk+σ′j
ASMj , and L1
′ =
H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||B′SMj ||T1). Furthermore, it
computes Y 1′(= MACL1′ [SM∗IDj , T1
∗, ASMj ]) and
then verifies Y 1′ = Y 1, if yes, goes to the next step.
(C) The NAN gateway selects a random number vN ∈ Z∗n
and computes CN = vN · P , and FN = vN · ASMj .
Then, it computes Q2 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T2], and
Y 2 = MACL1′ [NID, T2, CN ]. Here, T2 denotes the
current time stamp of NAN. Now, it generates a ses-
sion key (SK = H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||CN ||FN ).
Finally, it generates a pseudo number (φN ), computes
β = H(NID||φN ) ⊕ idSTj ||T2, and sends Response =
{β,CN , Q2, Y 2, φN , T2} to the SM.
(D) The SM first checks (T3 − T2) ≤ ∆T , it will ter-
minate the session if time stamp verification produces
negative result. Otherwise, obtains idSTj from β and then,
decrypts DSTj [Q2] to obtain SM
∗
IDj
, N∗ID, T2
∗, and
verifies N∗ID = NID and T2
∗ = T2. If conditions are not
true then terminates the session. Otherwise, it computes
Y 2′(= MACL1[NID, T2∗, CN ]) and verifies Y 2′ = Y 2,
if the condition is true then only proceeds to the next
step. Otherwise the NAN is not a legitimate entity and
the session will be terminated. Finally, the SM computes
WSMj = uSMj · CN and generates the session key
SK = H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||CN ||WSMj ) in order to
secure further communication between the SM and NAN
gateway. The flow of LAKA is shown in Fig. 2.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Formal analysis of LAKA using AVISPA
The AVISPA tool is designed for the Automated Verification
of Internet Security Protocols and Applications and it is quite
well known in the academia [17], [22], [38]–[40]. It has
four different backend model checkers: (i) on-the fly model-
checker; (ii) constraint-logic-based attack searcher; (iii) SAT-
based model-checker; and (iv) tree automata based on auto-
matic approximations of the analysis of security protocols. The
tool uses a role-based language, i.e., high level security proto-
col specification language (HLPSL), for specifying the role of
each agent. The roles are: (i) basic role, describes what initial
data can be used by an agent and how the transitions are being
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Smart Meter (SM) NAN gateway
 computes: ASMj= uSM j . P, BSMj= uSMj . SMprj
 L1 = H(SMIDj||NID||ASMj||BSMj||T1)
 Q1 = ESTj[SMIDj, NID ,T1] and Y1 = MACL1[SMIDj, T1, ASMj]
 computes: α = H(NID||ϕ)⊕ idSTj||T1
Start {α, Q1, ASMj ,Y1, ϕ,T1}
 checks: (T2-T1) ≤ ∆T and computes : H(NID||T1) and obtains idSTj
 decrypts Q1 using corresponding key of idSTj
 verifies: SMIDj
* = SMIDj, NID
* = NID , T1
* = T1
 computes: σj′ = H(SMIDj), BSMj
′ = ASMj, and
L1′ = H(SMIDj||NID||ASMj||BSMj
′||T1)
  computes: Y1′ (= MACL1
′[SMIDj
*, T1*, ASMj]) and verifies Y1′ = Y1
  computes: CN = vN . P, FN = vN . ASMj and Q2 = ESTj[SMIDj, NID ,T2]
  computes: Y2 = MACL1
′[NID, T2, CN],
  generates SK = H(SMIDj||NID||ASMj||CN ||FN) and
 computes: β = H(NID|| ϕN)⊕ idSTj|| T2
Response {β,CN, Q2, Y2, ϕN ,T2}
 checks = (T3-T2) ≤ ∆T
 obtains: idSTj from β
 decrypts: DSTj [Q2] to obtain SMIDj
*, NID
*
, T2
*
 verifies: NID
* = NID, and T2
* = T2
 computes: Y2′ = MACL1[NID, T2
*, CN] and Y2′ = Y2
 computes: WSMj = uSMj . CN
SK = H(SMIDj||NID||ASMj||CN || WSMj) SK = H(SMIDj||NID||ASMj||CN ||FN)
Fig. 2. Flow of the LAKA.
taking place in the protocol; (ii) composition role, describes the
session in which legitimate entities are communicating; and
(iii) environment role, details the global parameters, sessions
and an intruder knowledge in the protocol. Moreover, the tool
utilizes the channel(dy) to exploit the Dolve-Yao model [31].
1) Specifying LAKA in HLPSL script: We describe the
specification for the authentication and key establishment
phase, where two basic roles are involved, i.e., smart meter
(SM) and NAN gateway. In addition, the proposed scheme
has another two roles involved, namely, session and environ-
ment. Fig. 3 represents the role specification of the smart
meter – the receive (RCV) signal starts initial state, i.e.,
0 and changes state to 1. It (i.e., smart meter) then sends
{alpha′, Q1′, ASMj ′, Y 1′, φ, T1′} using SND signal to the
NAN. In State 3, using RCV signal the smart meter receives
a message {beta′, (vN ′ · P ), [SMIDj , NID, T2′]ST , H(NID,
T2′, C ′N ), φN , T2} from the NAN. Similarly, Fig. 4 rep-
resents the role specification of the NAN gateway – at
initial state (i.e., 0), RCV signal receives a message (i.e.,
{alpha′, Q1′, ASMj ′, Y 1′, φ, T1′}) from the smart meter.
Now it changes state to 1 and then SND signal sends
{beta′, (vN ′ · P ), [SMIDj , NID, T2′]ST , H(NID, T2′, C ′N ),
φN , T2} to the smart meter. Upon specifying the basic roles
(i.e., smart meter and NANGateway), we now specify the
session role of LAKA, as shown in Fig. 5. The session role
includes the parametrized instantiation of the basic role, e.g.,
SmartMeter(SM NAN, SK, H, SM S, SM R) and NANGate-
way(SM NAN, SK, H, NAN S, NAN R). The channel (dy)
means that all the messages sent by the SmartMeter and
NANGateway are also going to the attacker.
Finally, Fig. 6 describes the top-level role called envi-
ronment. This role comprises of the global constants and
also describes the construction of sessions in the protocol.
Moreover, in this role, an attacker may participate as a legal
agent since all the messages sent by the agents are also
role SmartMeter (SM, NAN : agent,
SK, ST : symmetric_key,
SMpub : public_key,
H          : hash_func,
RCV, SND : channel (dy) )
played_by SM def=
local State : nat,
idST, SMid, Nid, P : text,
phi, phiN : text,
T1, T2, SMpr                : text,
Q1, Q2, Y1, Y2 : message,
alpha, beta : message,
H : hash_func
Const  SmartMeter_NAN_uSM, NAN_SmartMeter_vN: protocol_id,
NAN_SmartMeter_Nid, SmartMeter_NAN_SMid : protocol_id, 
SmartMeter_NAN_T1,  NAN_SmartMeter_T2 : protocol_id,
SmartMeter_NAN_alpha, NAN_SmartMeter_beta : protocol_id,
sub1, sub2, sub3 : protocol_id,
init  State := 0
transition 
1. State = 0 /\ RCV (start) =|>
State′ := 1 /\ uSM′ := new ()
/\ T1′ := new ()
/\ ASM′ := (uSM . P)
…..
…..
/\ Y1′ := H(L1, SMid,T1′, ASM′)
/\ alpha′ := xor(H(Nid,phi′), idST) 
/\ SND (alpha′, Q1′, ASM′, Y1′, phi′, T1′)
/\ secret ({SMid, Nid}, sub1, {SmartMeter, NAN})
/\ witness (SM, NAN, SmartMeter_SM_uSM,  uSM′)
% SmartMeter has freshly generated the value of uSM
/\ witness (SM, NAN, SmartMeter_SM_uSM,  T1′)
% SmartMeter has freshly generated the value of T1
2. State = 3 /\ RCV (beta, (vN′ . P), {Smid, Nid, T2′}_ST, H(Nid,T2′,Cn′), 
phi′N, T2′) =|>
State′ := 2  /\ WSM′ := (uSM′ . Cn′)
/\ SK := H3(SMid, Nid, ASM′, Cn′, WSM′)
/\ secret ({SMid, Nid}, sub1, {SmartMeter, NAN})
/\ request (NAN, SmartMeter, NAN_SmartMeter_t2, T2′)
/\ request (NAN, SmartMeter, NAN_SmartMeter_vN, vN′)
end roleFig. 3. SmartMeter Specification in HLPSL.
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role NANGateway (SM, NAN : agent,
SK : symmetric_key,
ST : symmetric_key,
SMpub : public_key,
H          : hash_func,
RCV, SND : channel (dy))
played_by NAN def=
local State : nat,
idST, SMid, Nid, P : text,
phi, phiN : text,
T1, T2, SMpr                : text,
Q1, Q2, Y1, Y2 : message,
alpha, beta : message,
H           : hash_func
Const  SmartMeter_NAN_uSM, NAN_SmartMeter_vN: protocol_id, 
SmartMeter_NAN_SMid, NAN_SmartMeter_Nid: protocol_id, 
SmartMeter_NAN_T1, NAN_SmartMeter_T2: protocol_id,
SmartMeter_NAN_alpha, NAN_SmartMeter_beta : protocol_id,
sub1, sub2, sub3 : protocol_id,
init  State := 0
transition 
1. State = 0 /\ RCV (alpha′, Q1′, ASM′, Y1′, phi′, T1′) =|>
State′ := 1     /\ {SMid, Nid, T1′}_ST
/\ secret ({SMid, Nid}, sub1, {SmartMeter, NAN})
…..
…..
State′ := 2 /\ SND (beta′, (vN′ . P), {Smid, Nid, T2′}_ST, H(Nid,T2′,
Cn′), phi′N,T2′)
/\ secret ({SMid, Nid}, sub1, {SmartMeter, NAN})
/\ witness (SM, NAN, NAN_SmartMeter_vN,  vN′)
% SmartMeter has freshly generated the value of vN
/\ witness (SM, NAN, NAN_SmartMeter_t2,  T2′)
% SmartMeter has freshly generated the value of T2
end role
Fig. 4. NAN gateway Specification in HLPSL.
role session (SM, NAN : agent,
SK : symmetric_key,
ST : symmetric_key,
SMpub : public_key, 
H : hash_func)
def=
local SM_S, SM_R, NAN_S, NAN_R : channel (dy)
composition
SmartMeter (SM, NAN, SK, H, SM_S, SM_R)
/\ SmartMeter (SM, NAN, SK, H, NAN_S, NAN_R)
end role
Fig. 5. Session role in HLPSL.
going to the attacker. In our specification the attacker is
represented by constant ‘i’ who has initial intruder knowl-
edge of the agent names, public keys, hash functions, etc.
Moreover, one secrecy and four authentication goals have
been initially verified, as follows: secrecy of sub1, authentica-
tion on authentication on SmaterMeter NAN SMid, authen-
tication on NAN SmartMeter Nid, authentication on Smater-
Meter NAN T1, authentication on NAN SmaterMeter T2.
2) Formal verification simulation results: LAKA is ver-
ified using the on-the-fly model checker (OFMC) backend,
which is widely utilized by several schemes, e.g., [17], [22],
[39], [40]. The OFMC verifies against the replay attack and
the MITM attack with the bounded number of sessions. Fig. 7
depicts the verification results, i.e., SAFE from the Dolve-Yao
attack model and GOALs are achieved as specified.
role environment()
def=
Const SmartMeter, NANGatway: agent,
SK : symmetric_key,
ST : symmetric_key,
SMpub : public_key,
H: hash_func,
SMid,Nid,uSM, vN, alpha, beta, t1, t2 : text,
SmartMeter_NAN_uSM, NAN_SmartMeter_vN, : protocol_id, 
SmartMeter_NAN_SMid, NAN_SmartMeter_Nid : protocol_id,
SmartMeter_NAN_T1, NAN_SmartMeter_T2 : protocol_id,
SmartMeter_NAN_alpha, NAN_SmartMeter_beta : protocol_id,
sub1, sub2, sub3 : protocol_id   
intruder knowledge = {SmartMeter, NANGateway, H}
composition
session (SmartMeter, NANGateway, H)
/\ session (SmartMeter, i, H)
/\ session (NANGateway, i, H) 
end role
goal
secrecy_of sub1
% secrecy_of sub2
% secrecy_of sub3
authentication_on SmaterMeter_NAN_SMid
authentication_on NAN_SmartMeter_Nid
authentication_on SmaterMeter_NAN_T1
authentication_on NAN_SmaterMeter_T2
end goal
environment()   
Fig. 6. Environment and goal in HLPSL.
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE                   
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
/home/span/span/project/LAKA.if
GOAL
as_specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 0.07s
visitedNodes: 12 nodes
depth: 1000 plies
Fig. 7. Simulation verification output.
B. Informal security analysis under Dolve-Yao
The security of LAKA is built on the hardness of elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), encryption and
hashing algorithms and therefore it (LAKA) can safe against
the popular attacks.
1) Replay attack: LAKA can resist the replay attack.
Replay attack at the NAN gateway: Assume that in the
authentication and key establishment phase, an ill-intention
adversary (i.e., Eve) eavesdrops communication from the SM
to NAN gateway and captures start {α,Q1, ASMj , Y 1, φ, T1}
message. To launch the replay attack at time (Teve1), an at-
tacker can resend the message {α,Q1, ASMj , Y 1, φeve, Teve1}
to the NAN gateway. Here eve1 is Eve’s time stamp. However,
this message will be detected due to the verification of the time
stamp, i.e., (T2 − Teve1) ≤ ∆T at the NAN gateway. More-
over, assume that if the attacker go-through the time stamp
verification, somehow, then he/she must need to provide uSMj
to compute L1eve = H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||BSMj ||T1) that
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is being used to verify Y 1 = MACL1[SMIDj , T1, ASMj ].
However, following the ECDLP assumptions, obtaining uSMj
is a hard problem. Furthermore, Eve cannot change the real
time stamp in sub-message Q1 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T1]
since Q1 is ciphered with the encryption key (i.e., STj),
which is only owned by the legal meter and NAN gateway.
Thus the attacker replay message will be failed again (i.e.,
T1∗ 6= Teve1) at the NAN gateway.
Replay attack at the smart meter: Assume that if Eve eaves-
drops on communication from the NAN gateway to meter and
captures Response = {β,CN , Q2, Y 2, φN , T2} message. To
launch replay attack at time (Teve2), the attacker could resend
{β,CN , Q2, Y 2, φNeve , Teve2} to the meter. Nevertheless, this
message will be detected due to the time stamp verification,
i.e., (T3 − Teve2) ≤ ∆T . Furthermore, to verify Y 2 =
MACL1′ [NID, T2, CN ], the attacker must have to provide
vN , which is not feasible due to the hardness of the ECDLP.
Despite that, the sub-message Q2 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T2]
also contains the real time stamp, which cannot be changed
without knowing the encryption key (STj). Thus the attacker
replay message cannot be succeeded (T2∗ 6= Teve2) at the
meter. Thus, the replay attack is thwarted.
2) Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): In this attack sce-
nario, a hostile intruder (e.g., Eve) may intercept communi-
cation channels that connecting two legal parties and make
believe them (i.e., SM and NAN gateway) that both are
communicating directly with each other. Assume that Eve in-
tercepts start {α,Q1, ASMj , Y 1, φ, T1} message and replaces
it with {αeve, Q1, ASMeve , Y 1eve, φeve, Teve1} to initiate the
process of LAKA. This message however is not helpful for
Eve, since Y 1 is a keyed MAC, which is computed over L1.
Note that Eve cannot attempt to generate true L1 that includes
BSMj , computed over long-term secret key of the meter
SMprj , which is not known to the attacker. Moreover, Eve
has no way to alter Q1 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T1] without
knowing STj . Therefore, Eve cannot play as MITM.
Similar to aforementioned, assume that if Eve intercepts
Response = {β,CN , Q2, Y 2, φN , T2} and replaces it with
a fabricated message {βeve, CNeve , Q2, Y 2eve, φNeve , Teve2}.
Likewise start message, Eve cannot compute right Y 2eve and
Q2. Thus, he/she cannot succeed to mount MITM.
3) Impersonation attack: In this attack, assume that
Eve tries to impersonate as a legal meter to the NAN
gateway. To do that, Eve randomly picks uSMeve and
computes ASMeve using uSMeve · P and fabricates a
false BSMeve . Eve then computes own messages, i.e.,
L1eve = H(SMIDeve ||NID||ASMeve ||BSMeve ||T1eve) and
Y 1eve = MACL1eve [SMIDeve , T1eve, ASMeve ] and sends
{αeve, Q1, ASMeve , Y 1eve, φeve, T1eve} to the NAN gate-
way. However, the NAN gateway cannot obtained the real
identity of the meter since it is encrypted in Q1 =
ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T1] therefore Eve’s fake identity can-
not be verified i.e., (SM∗IDj 6= SMIDeve). In addition,
the NAN gateway cannot determine the correct L1eve =
H(SMIDeve ||NID||ASMeve ||BSMeve ||T1eve) due to the fab-
ricated BSMeve instead of B
′
SMj =
1
Mk+σ′j
ASMj . Therefore
Y 1 6= Y 1eve will be detected.
Similarly, Eve cannot present as a legal NAN gateway to a
meter because he/she does not possess the NAN’s secret key
Mk, STj and identity (NID). Therefore, it is not feasible to
launch impersonation attack.
4) Attacks to Forward security (FS): The FS refers –
compromise of the long term keys (e.g., secret shared or
private keys) of legitimate partners should not be disclosed the
secrecy of old sessions and their keys. The FS mainly has two
notations, (i) perfect forward security (PFS) and (ii) master-key
forward secrecy(MFS). Here, PFS defines that if a compromise
of long-term private key of either the legitimate parties (e.g., a
SM or NAN gateway) should not be compromising secrecy of
the previously established sessions. Whereas, MFS satisfies
– whenever the master key of a legitimate entity is being
compromised then the protocol should hold the security of
session key. The proposed LAKA therefore holds both PFS
and MFS properties. For instance, assume that if the long-
term secret keys (e.g., (STj , SMprj ,Mk) of meter and NAN
are exposed to Eve. However Eve still cannot determine the
previous session keys because each previous session between
the meter and NAN is computed independently and fresh i.e.,
(SK = H(SMIDj ||NID||ASMj ||CN ||WSMj ))) that includes
ASMj (= uSMj ·P ), CN (=vN ·P ) and WSMj (=uSMj ·CN ).
Here uSMj and vN are random numbers of the meter and
NAN, respectively. In addition, with the fact of the ECDLP
hardness, Eve cannot determine the real value of uSM and
vN , which are random numbers. Therefore, the proposed
scheme holds FS.
5) Smart meter key compromise impersonation: Typically,
smart meters are deployed outside the homes in an open
environment. Assume that if the attacker compromises a meter
by damaging the physical box and tries to learn the secret. Eve
can use these secrets to mount key compromise impersonation
attack of other non-compromise smart meters. However, in
LAKA, the compromise of a smart meter’s secrets does not
imply that the secrets of other non-compromised smart meters.
Moreover, in our scheme, each smart meter has a shared token
(STj), which is unique and shared with the NAN gateway.
Therefore, such attack cannot work on LAKA.
6) Known session key attack: In the known key attack,
Eve can intercept messages (e.g., Start and Response) in
authentication and key establishment phase. Then he/she tries
to obtain the session key from previous sessions. In such cases,
it is paramount requirement that the security of current session
key is remain secure. The proposed LAKA however is secure
against known session key attack, since it establishes a shared
session key (i.e., SK). Note that the security strength of SK
relies upon the hardness/security of the one-way hash function
and secrets. Therefore, with the fact of the output of one-way
hashing, Eve cannot determine a relation with pre-images of
the hash values and so the secrets.
7) Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: To mitigate DoS threats
is very challenging, since these threats can aim malicious ac-
tivities at various level in the SENs. For instance, the attacker
can mount a DoS attack by replaying old messages. However,
the scheme proposed in this paper can mitigate to DoS attack
to some extent. As described in the Section III.3, the proposed
approach exploits the advantages of timestamps (e.g., T1 and
T3, and T2) and random numbers (e.g., uSMj and vN ) of the
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TABLE II
SECURITY SERVICES COMPARISONS
[14] [17] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] LAKA
Mutual authentication
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Session-Key security
√
Weak
√ √ √ √ √
Message Integrity
√ √ √
Anonymity
√ √ √ √ √
Forward security
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Protect replay attack
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Impersonation attack safeguard
√ √ √
MITM attack protection
√ √ √ √ √
Safe from DoS attack
√
meter and NAN gateway, respectively. Therefore, the proposed
scheme can resist such DoS attacks.
C. Security goals
1) Mutual authentication and key agreement: A mutual
authentication is performed between the meter(SMIDj ) and
NAN gateway (NID). The NAN gateway authenticates SM
by checking SM∗IDj = SMIDj , refers step B in Section
III-3. Similarly, the SM authenticates to NAN gateway by
checking N∗ID = NID, thus, the proposed LAKA maintains
mutual trust between the legitimate parties. Moreover, after
performing mutual trust for each session, LAKA establishes
a session key (SK). This session key agreement (SK) can
provide subsequent secure communication to involved entities.
2) Confidentiality: To prevent eavesdropping threats, con-
fidentiality is one of the highest requirement, which is recom-
mended by the NIST security guidline, the readers may refer
to [27]. In the energy network, the security of the protocol
messages is as important as the data security (i.e., confidential-
ity). Otherwise the protocol messages may reveal many useful
information, e.g., device identities, etc. Nevertheless, to avoid
such eavesdropping threats, the proposed scheme exploits
symmetric cryptosystems that provide confidentiality, e.g.,
Q1 = ESTj [ SMIDj , NID, T1], Y 1 = MACL1[SMIDj , T1,
ASMj ], Q2 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID, T2] and Y 2 = MACL1′
[NID, T2, CN ], refer to Section III-3. Moreover, each SM
device possesses a unique secret token STj and its identifier
idSTj in the tamper-proof memory. Here, STj is used to
encrypt HIDj , NID, T1. Moreover, to decrypt DSTj [Q1], the
NAN gateway must possess corresponding key of idSTj ,
otherwise, it cannot decrypt the garbled message. Finally, the
subsequent messages can be kept secure using the session key.
3) Integrity: Integrity is another main security property in
the SG, which is recommended by the NIST security guide-
lines [27]. Assume that an adversary tries to alter the wireless
messages during the transit. However, the proposed scheme
prevents message alteration during the transit. As we can
see from Step (A) in Section III-3, the SM device computes
Y 1(= MACL1[SMIDj , T1, ASMj ]), which is computed over
L1. Note that – L1 is computed by only the legitimate SM,
therefore Eve cannot alter SM’s messages when they are in
transit. Likewise, the messages of NAN gateway are also
protected with such integrity checks.
4) Anonymity: Assume that an adversary overhears on
wireless packet and spoofs the identities, e,g., SMIDj and
Gas/ 
Electricity 
Smart Meter
NAN Laptop 
Wireless
USB
Fig. 8. Experimental Setting.
TABLE III
EXECUTION TIME (in ms)
Point multiplication Encryption Decryption Hash MAC
time 2,900 3.8 41.1 39 8.6
idSTj for own purpose. In our scheme, when a smart meter
connects to the NAN gateway, it does not send SMIDj as a
plaintext but hide the identity in Q1 = ESTj [SMIDj , NID,
T1]. Moreover, it can be noticed from the proposed scheme
that the pseudonymity of idSTj is being provided using α
and β. Resultant, only the legitimate NAN gateway can learn
the identity of meter by decrypting Q1 = ESTj [SMIDj ,
NID, T1] using the secret token (STj). Thus, it achieves
identity anonymity and protects from identity spoofing attack.
In addition, the comparison on security services among [14],
[17], [19]–[23] and the proposed scheme is given in Table II.
We can notice that the proposed LAKA can provide more
security services than previously proposed ones.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Experimental setup: As shown in Fig. 8, consider a SMI
network, where a (gas or electricity) smart meter (SM) com-
municates with the NAN gateway over wireless channels. We
used TelsoB mote as a SM equipped with a 16 bit processor
runs at a clock frequency 8 MHz, 48 KB of ROM and 10
KB of RAM, and 2AA battery powered [41]. The laptop is
used as the NAN gateway (e.g, Intel 2.59 GHz, and 16 GB of
RAM). Note that in this paper we measure the computational
and communicational energy costs only for the smart meter,
as it is a resource-constrained meter. We intentionally omitted
the computation and communication energy costs for the NAN
gateway since it is a resource-rich system, which can execute
cryptographic operations much faster compared to a SM.
For the ECC computations, we used TinyECC library [42]
[43] which supports all operations, including point addition,
point doubling and point multiplication, exponentiation opera-
tions for the TelsoB device. In our experiment settings, we
used MD5 function for one-way hashing as the base hash
functions. For encryption, the AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard) symmetric-key algorithm has been used, which is
1949-3053 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSG.2018.2857558, IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid
9
TABLE IV
ENERGY COSTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS AT SMART METER
Operations at SM Energy costs (in µJ)
Point multiplication 15,660
Encryption 20.52
Decryption 221.94
Hash (MD5) 210.6
MAC 46.44
Total computational energy costs (in µJ) ≈ 16,160
integrated in MSP430s CC2420 radio. The MAC operation is
computed via cipher block chaining (CBC).
Computation cost: In order to measure the computation
cost, following message sizes have been used for authen-
tication and key establishment phase (Section III). For in-
stance, IDs = 1 byte, hashing = 16 bytes, pseudo random
number = 8 bytes, MAC = 4 bytes, time stamp = 4 bytes,
key size = 16 bytes and we choose to exploit secp160r1
defined over a 160-bit prime field. Therefore, the length of
messages in LAKA, i.e., start = {α,Q1, ASMj , Y 1, φ, T1}
and Response = {β,CN , Q2, Y 2, φN , T2} are 68 and 68
bytes long, respectively. Table III shows the execution time
(t) taken by the proposed scheme for each operation, e.g.,
a point multiplication takes 2,900 ms, AES takes 3.8 ms,
and hash and MAC operation requires 39 ms and 8.6 ms,
respectively. Moreover, we evaluate energy-efficiency consid-
ering, for example, smart gas meters which are incorporated
in the SMI by the energy companies, such as EDF energy
[44], Scottish Power [45], etc. The meter (e.g., gas [26])
is running on battery-powered, where energy-efficiency is
a prime concern. However, to evaluate energy efficiency –
we consider energy price of cryptographic primitives on the
SM. By using voltage (V ol), current (Curr) and time (t),
i.e., V ol × Curr × t, we can calculate the energy incurred
by cryptographic operations. Here, V ol is the battery (AA)
voltage, Curr is the electric charge, and t is the execution
time for a cryptographic operation. Without loss of generality,
V ol = 3 V and Curr = 1.8 µA values are taken from
the (TelosB) data-sheet [41]. Table IV shows the sum of
computational energy consumed by LAKA is ≈ 16,160 µJ.
Finally, the comparisons on total computational cost among
LAKA and other schemes, such as [17], [19]–[23] are given in
Table V. It can be noticed from Table V, the proposed LAKA
is more akin than the protocol proposed in [22] by 1t, but
the total computation cost of the proposed scheme is less than
the others. However, the proposed LAKA can provide more
security services as shown in Table II.
Communication cost: The proposed scheme needs two
communication exchanges (Start and Response) from a smart
meter to the NAN gateway and vice-versa, as shown in Fig.
Fig. 2. Whereas the schemes proposed in [17], [19], [20],
[21], [23] required three communication rounds to establish
a session key. Moreover, the data transmission and reception
are expensive in terms of energy, for instance transmitting one-
bit over a wireless channel needs more energy than computing
one-bit. To calculate the communication cost, Meulenaer el al’s
communicational model has been used in this paper, where
sending and receiving one-bit needed 0.72 µJ and 0.81 µJ,
respectively, for a TelosB mote.
For the comparison purposes, Table VI shows that how
many number of bits are transmitted and received at smart
meter in [19], [20], [21], and [23]. Moreover, considering the
Meulenaer el al’s communicational model, the schemes pro-
posed in [19], [20], [21], [23] required ≈ 2572µJ, ≈ 1443µJ,
≈ 1247µJ and ≈ 4850 µJ, respectively, energy to send and
receive the messages.
On the contrary, in the proposed LAKA, a battery-powered
smart meter required ≈ 832 µJ energy to send and receive
the messages. Hence, we conclude that the proposed LAKA
is a lightweight scheme than [19]–[21], [23], and it can be
suitable for the resource-constrained smart gas meter and smart
electricity meter in the SMI.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a comprehensive lightweight secu-
rity scheme for smart energy networks. The proposed LAKA
protocol achieves two-way authentication between a remote
SM and a NAN and obtains proper session key agreement
for securing data communications. Security analysis has been
presented using the AVISPA tool. Moreover, our informal se-
curity analysis indicated that the proposed LAKA fulfilled the
NIST model security requirements. Finally, the test-bed results
have shown that this scheme can improve communicational
and computational efficiency than the other schemes.
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TABLE V
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISONS AT SMART METER AND NAN GATEWAY
Schemes Smart meter NAN gateway Total costs
[17] 3texp + 8H + 1SV + 2ASED 3texp + 7H + 1SG + 2ASED 6texp + 15H + 1SG + 1SV + 4ASED
[19] 4t+ 1tadd + 1texp + 5H 3t+ 2tbp + 1tadd + 1texp + 5H 7t+ 2tbp + 2tadd + 2texp + 10H
[20] 3t+ 3tadd + 1texp + 6H 2t+ 2tbp + 3tadd + 1texp + 6H 5t+ 2tbp + 6tadd + 2texp + 12H
[21] 4t+ 1tadd + 5H 6t+ 2tadd + 6H 10t+ 3tadd + 11H
[22] 2t+ 3H 3t+ 4H 5t+ 7H
[23] 1H + 1MAC + 2SED + 3ASED 1H + 1MAC + 2SED + 3ASED 2H + 2MAC + 4SED + 6ASED
LAKA 3t+ 4H + 2MAC + 2SED 3t+ 5H + 2MAC + 2SED 6t+ 9H + 4MAC + 4SED
t - point-multiplication; tbp - bilinear pairing; tadd - point addition; texp - exponentiation operation; H - one-way hash function; SED - encryption and
decryption; ASED - asymmetric encryption and decryption;SG - signature generation; SV - signature verification; MAC - message authentication code.
TABLE VI
COMMUNICATION COSTS IN [19], [20], [21], [23] AT SMART METER (in µJ)
Smart meter [19] [20] [21] [23] LAKA
Send 2240× 0.72 1248× 0.72 832× 0.72 3712× 0.72 544× 0.72
Receive 1184× 0.81 672× 0.81 800× 0.81 2688× 0.81 544× 0.81
Total energy costs (in µJ) ≈ 2572 ≈ 1443 ≈ 1247 ≈ 4850 ≈ 832
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